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I. SUMMARY
Storey has focused its brief on issues that are not before the Court on this appeal while
failing to justify the lower court's actual ruling under Idaho res judicata principles.
Storey argues that the Court may affirm the trial court if the Trust did not establish below
that latent defects are in fact present and at issue in the second arbitration-i.e., if the Trust did
not "demonstrate by record evidence" that it "exercised reasonable due diligence" prior to the
Payment Arbitration to discover the defects it alleged in the Defect Arbitration demand. E.g.,
Respondent's Brief ("Storey Br.") at 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 18, 20, 22-30, 31, 36, 49-52, 54. No such
issue was before the lower court, which rejected the Trust's efforts to supply evidence of latent
defects as irrelevant. The lower court deemed the evidence irrelevant because of the procedural
ruling it made: it would decide res judicata as a pure question of law on the assumption that
latent defects existed. As the lower court described its own ruling, it was
predicated on an assumption that there well could be or probably might even
have been latent defects .
. . . What Mr. Hanks knew then or the owners of the house actually knew then
or know now about these . .. [alleged] defects in construction or whether they
are, in fact, latent defects I think is immaterial. 1

The court took this approach because it might-and, in light of the court's ruling, didavoid the need for a mini-trial. The trial court ruled that, even assuming that the Trust could not
have discovered the defects through reasonable diligence at the time of the first arbitration, res
judicata nevertheless barred the Trust from pursuing such claims, accepting Storey' s argument
that any defect claim arising under the same contract was barred by res judicata whether it was
1

Supp Tr. Vol. I (Supplemental Repotter's Transcript on Appeal), p. 15, L. 21 -p. 16, L. 25 (emphasis added).

1

previously discoverable or not. Having exercised its discretion to adopt this procedural
sequence, the trial court repeatedly declined even to consider the examples the Trust provided of
actual latent defects, holding that what the owners knew or should have known about the defects
was irrelevant to its ruling.

Had the trial court decided to consider the question whether there were any latent defects,
the limited examples the Trust did provide-coupled with the evidence that it would be months
before the Trust could uncover the remaining defects by removing and replacing the roofs and
walls-would have mandated a continuance of any hearing on such an issue until late 2008.
Only then could the Trust have provided the full catalog of Storey's pervasive failure to perform.
But, faced with the procedure the lower court adopted and the ruling the lower court then made,
there was no occasion for the Trust to request such a continuance. At Storey' s invitation, the
trial court ruled that it need not decide whether the Trust could establish that actual latent defects
existed. This ruling and only this ruling is before this Court on appeal.
Storey also argues that the Trust actually litigated the defective work issue in the first
arbitration. See Storey Br. at 2, 8, 11-14, 23. This contention is wrong but also irrelevant. No
evidence of any defect was presented or ttied in the first arbitration, even though the arbitration
pleadings contained a general allegation of defective work. But even if some defective work
issue had been tried in the first case, it was by definition impossible at that time for the Trust to
present and try a latent defect claim-a claim based on defects it could not at that time have
discovered through reasonable diligence. The trial court's erroneous ruling that res judicata bars
undiscoverable claims is the issue on this appeal.

2

Storey has failed to sustain this ruling. Idaho defines a "transaction" for res judicata
purposes as the material facts constituting the elements of the claim. It does not define
"transaction" as the parties' overall contractual relationship where different claims depending on
different material facts may arise from that contractual relationship. Idaho also does not compel
parties to do the impossible: to litigate claims in an early action that they could not then
reasonably discover. Where the material facts constituting the claim could not be discovered
through reasonable diligence at the time of the first action, even if claims with the same generic
label were pled (and even if such claims were actually tried), res judicata does not preclude a
second action asserting the previously undiscoverable claims.
The parties' contract-which Storey contends is the touchstone for applying res
judicata-independently compels reversal. It limits the claims a party must bring in a given
arbitration to those then actually kn.own. Even if Idaho case law held as Storey contends it does,
arbitration is a creature of contract, and the parties may, and did, agree on their own rules,
including those determining what constitutes a "new" claim for purposes of a second arbitration.
Storey does not mention this dispositive provision in its Opposition.

II.ARGUMENT
A.

At Storey's Urging, the Trial Court Ruled It Was Irrelevant Whether the Trust's
Claimed Defects Were Undiscoverable at the Time of the Payment Arbitration, and
Denied the Trust the Opportunity to Present Proof of the Latent Defects at a
Summary Trial.
Storey argues that the trial court's ruling must be affirmed unless the Trust created

specific questions of fact by proof of defects that (a) were not litigated in, and (b) could not have
been discovered by the exercise of due diligence at the time of, the first arbitration. E.g., Storey

3

Br. at 9, 54. The Trust had no such burden. The court adopted Storey's argument that it could

avoid considering this question by determining that there was no exception to res judicata even
for undiscoverable claims where the same contract was at issue in both actions.
The trial court had initially planned to conduct a "summary" or "mini" trial in which the
Trust would introduce evidence of construction defects that it contended had not been
discoverable at the time of the first arbitration, and the trial court would determine which specific

defects, if any, were barred. Storey proposed the "summary trial" in its motion to stay the Defect
Arbitration,2 which the trial court initially granted. 3 At that time, Storey was seeking discovery
from the Tmst of information about the defects, since, as Storey stated, "Storey has the burden of
proof on its plea of res judicata" as to any defect. 4 Storey argued that, to prepare for the
summary trial, it needed to know the nature, extent and location of each alleged defect, the
identity of people who observed it, when and how it was discovered, and what made the
condition a defect or "latent."5
However, the trial court then decided that it should first determine, purely as a legal issue,
whether there was any exception to res judicata, assuming there were latent defects, where the
second action arose from the same constmction contract, because the court's decision on that
question of law might avoid any need for the summary trial on factual issues of latency.
This approach was first considered at a status conference on April 14, 2008. The court
decided to first determine whether the res judicata issue could be resolved as a matter of law
2

Ex, No. 3, Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Temporarily Stay Arbitration Pending Hearing re: Res Judicata, p. 19, LL.
18-19. In a later pleading, Storey emphasized that "the summary trial sought by Storey's Motion to Stay is the
proper time and place to determine the res judicata effect, if any, of the [arbitration] panel's rulings in the prior
arbitration[.]"' R, Vol. 1, p. 201, LL. 16-18.
3
R, Vol. 2, p. 247, LL. 4-6.
4
R, Vol. 2, p. 291, L. 14.
5
Id., LL. 16-20.

4

rather than conduct a potentially unnecessary mini trial. 6 For this reason, no summary trial was
scheduled. Instead, on April 17, 2008, the Court entered a Scheduling Order setting oral
argument for June 19, 2008 on the issue of law defined by Storey's contention that latent defects
were no exception to res judicata. 7
The Trust's brief for the hearing described the decision the court had made at the status
conference in terms that Storey did not dispute:
On April 14, 2008, the court held a status conference regarding the summary trial
re res judicata. During that hearing, Storey asserted that SVT's entire claim
should be barred and not that only specific issues would be subject to the defense
of res judicata. Storey agreed that for the purpose of this matter only on the
theory of claim preclusion--in comparison to issue preclusion--the relevant
facts were that its [sic] is the same construction contract and the same
improvements which were at issue in first arbitration and the current
arbitration. All parties agreed that those facts, but only those facts, were
undisputed. From that discussion, this court determined that the matter of claim
preclusion could be heard on motion before an evidentiary, summary trial on the
issues. As a result, Plaintiff [Storey] filed the instant Motion which is in the
nature of a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment on undisputed facts. If
[Storey's] motion is denied, the court must then determine whether issues would
be barred in the current arbitration. 8
The trial court made a procedural ruling: the hearing to consider the fact question
whether true latent defects existed would be deferred in favor of a hearing on a pure question of

law-i.e., on "undisputed facts." If Storey's legal contentions were upheld, there would be no
evidentiary hearing. The entire point of this procedural ruling was to avoid any need to consider
the very evidence that Storey now contends the Trust should have presented on that motion-

6

R, Vol. 2, p. 322. The minutes are not entirely clear, but do indicate the court stated that "counsel wants the Ct to
determine Res Judicata as a matter of law, can wait for counsel to gather [evidence] then make a decision, [but it]
would make more sense for the Ct to look at Res Judicata first."
7
R, Vol. 2, p. 337.
8
R, Vol. 2, p. 372, L. 19 - p. 373, L. 1 (emphasis added).

5

whether the defects alleged by the Trust could have been discovered by reasonable diligence
prior to the Payment Arbitration. The trial court had discretion to define the issue for hearing in
this manner in the hope of achieving efficiency and avoiding the hearing that Storey now in
effect contends took place.9
Storey's own brief to the trial court described a narrow legal issue for decision,
contradicting Storey's current invention of a hearing that the lower court never held:

IL ISSUE
Are Defendants barred as a matter of law from pursuing their claim for
construction defects in a second arbitration because Defendants made a claim for
construction defects in a 2003 arbitration and both Defendants' prior and current
claim for defects arises out of the same construction contract? 10
This description of the issue is in substance parallel to that quoted above from the Trust's brief
for the same hearing: i.e., whether res judicata bars any defect claim because a claim for
construction defects was asserted in the first arbitration and the "current arbitration" arises from
the "same construction contract." 11 There is not a hint in this description of the factual issue
Storey now claims was before the trial court: i.e., whether the "current claim for defects"
consists of defects that were not discoverable at the time of the first arbitration through the
exercise of due diligence.

In the June 19, 2008 hearing, the trial court adopted Storey' s argument on the defined
legal issue:

9

See I.R.C.P. 16(a), (b) (court may make rulings in pretrial conferences to expedite the disposition of the action and
of pending motions); Peterson v. McCawley, 135 Idaho 282,284, 16 P.3d 958 (Ct. App. 2000) (trial courts have
discretion in fashioning pretrial orders for efficient case management).
10
Ex, No. 6 (Storey Constr., lnc.'s Mem. in Supp. of Motion to Enforce Bar of Res Judicata), p. 3, LL. 19-22.
11
R, Vol. 2, p. 372, L. 19-p. 373, L. I.

6

Latent defects do not appear to be an exception to the bar of res judicata under
Idaho law.... 12

After this ruling, the trial court invoked this purely legal decision to deem all efforts by the Trust
to offer further evidence of the actual latent defects it was gradually uncovering "irrelevant." In
the same period, Storey engaged in actions that would have been pointless had the Trust already
fatally failed to show that there actually were latent defects, as Storey now in effect contends.
In June and July 2008, as the Trust began removing roofs and walls and creating
photographic and video evidence of the specific defects being uncovered, disputes arose over the
extent of, and procedures for, Storey's access to the Trust's property. While the Trust was
investigating, recording and repairing the defects, 13 Storey moved for an order to "preserv[e]
evidence," and to allow broader access for Storey and its retained expert to inspect the
construction. 14 Obviously, Storey needed access and an opportunity to make its own record of
the evidence because, if the trial court's legal ruling were reversed, there would be a hearing on

the issue of which defects were "latent. " 15
A month after the res judicata ruling, in a brief on Storey's motion for authority to inspect
the property, Storey argued:
Storey is seeking access to Defendant's property because even though the
arbitration is barred, that ruling could be reversed by the Supreme Court. In the
event of a reversal, Defendants would have proceeded with demolition and repairs

12

Tr, Vol. 1, p. 200, L. 25 -p. 201, L. I.
R, Vol. 3, p. 533, L. 23 - p. 534, L. 8 (affidavit of Rick Stark, an employee of the Trust's contractor performing
demolition and repair of defective structures).
14
R, Vol. 3, p. 471, LL. 10-22 (Storey's motion for inspection of the property, filed July 9, 2008, seeking
r,reservation of evidence); id. p. 472, L. 21 -p. 473, L. 11 (seeking access for Storey's retained expert).
5
On September 5, 2008, Storey and the Trust filed a Stipulation for Protective Order agreeing to terms for
inspection of the property, preservation of evidence, and for the Trust to supply information on defects. R, Vol. 3,
pp. 569-73.
13

7

thereby destroying evidence and eliminating Storey' s ability to investigate and
·
. granted .16
mspect
un Iess access to Storey ts
The minutes of the oral argument on this motion state that Storey argued that "defendants [sic Storey] seek access to property to see if the alleged defects were latent."

17

The trial court

concluded that, because of the pending appeal of its ruling, the "Ct is not governing a discovery
process," and "these are all issues for a later hearing." 18
Storey thus conceded that the very evidence it now contends the Trust should have
presented in early June was still being developed and that the full extent of the defects at issueand the question whether they were latent-depended upon the results of a process that would go
on for months and to which Storey needed access to prepare for the potential later hearing.
The trial court later expressly confirmed that, in its prior ruling-the only ruling before
this Court-it had assumed that there were latent defects and had ruled that res judicata baned
an arbitration of such defects. The Trust filed a Motion for Reconsideration, submitting
affidavits evidencing some of the additional latent defects that had been uncovered since the
ruling, during the first few weeks of the demolition and repair work. 19 The trial court held:
The issue that seems to be raised by the affidavits and by this motion to
reconsider is, look, judge, these are, in fact, latent defects. Look, we have
affidavits that show these were defects or there are defects and/or they might
show that these defects are latent and could not have been discovered .
. . . I'm not changing or modifying my prior ruling. ...
It is my view and my recollection as to the motion for summary judgment
on the res judicata issue that that ruling was predicated on an assumption that
16

R, Vol. 3, p. 544, LL. 1-4 (emphasis added) (Storey's reply briefon motion for inspection, filed July 21, 2008).
R, Vol. 3, p. 565.
18
Id. p. 566 (emphasis added).
19
R, Vol. 3, No. 75, pp. 448-49 (Motion for Reconsideration and Notice of Hearing (June 30, 2008)); id. No. 94
(Amended Notice of Hearing (Aug. 7, 2008)).
17

8

there well could be or probably might even have been latent defects. . . . What
Mr. Hanks knew then or the owners of the house actually knew then or know
now about these . .. [alleged] defects in construction or whether they are, in
fact, latent defects I think is immaterial. 20
This record plainly demonstrates three things. First, in accepting Storey's contention
regarding Idaho law on res judicata, the trial court ruled only on the narrow legal issue whether,

assuming the alleged defects were latent, res judicata would still bar the Trust's claim because
they arose out of the same construction contract that was involved in the first arbitration.
Second, the summary trial that was originally planned was scratched because the question
whether there were latent defects was now irrelevant. Third, had there been such a hearing, it
could not have occurred for months--even Storey claimed it needed to engage in intensive
inspection of the dismantled roofs and walls over a period of months in order to "see if the
alleged defects are latent. " 21
Had the trial court rejected Storey's version of Idaho law and required the Trust to
establish which defects were latent and thus eligible for arbitration, the Trust would have been
entitled to a continuance of several months because the work was scheduled to continue through
at least October 2008. 22 The trial court rendered any such motion both futile and improper when
it made the procedural decision to avoid the hearing on that issue if it adopted Storey's legal
contention, which it then did.

20

Supp Tr, Vol. I (Supplemental Reporter's Transcript on Appeal), p. 15, L.21- p. 16, L. 25 (emphasis added).
Storey argues that the Trust failed to respond to discovery regarding the defects (Storey Br. at 4 & n.11). The trial
court ruled that the existence of actual defects was "immaterial." Further, the main "discovery" process was the
investigation and repair work that took place for months after the trial court's ruling, all of which was observed and
recorded by Storey.
21
R, Vol. 3, p. 565.
22
See R, Vol. 3, p. 534 (Mr. Stark stated in bis July 17, 2008 affidavit that the schedule for demolition, inspection
and repair was already ''close to rmming into the winter season.").

9

In short, Storey succeeded in confining the ruling below to a pure question of law, but
would now prefer to have this Court affirm on the basis that the Trust failed to present evidence
that that very ruling defined as irrelevant.

B.

The Trust Did Present Evidence of Actual Latent Defects.
At the time of the trial court's ruling, the Trust's investigation into the defects had barely

begun, and discovery was barely underway. But, in order to provide some factual context for its
legal contentions, the Trust submitted affidavits providing examples of latent defects that had
appeared by the time its brief was due.
The Trust filed the affidavit of Don Jackson, who had been caretaker of the Trust's
property since March 2005, and was familiar with events described in the log maintained by his
predecessor. 23 Jackson had personally observed structural failures that revealed underlying
construction defects that had been concealed by roofing and by interior and exterior walls and
first manifested themselves through damage appearing after the first arbitration:
•

After heavy snowfall in the winter of 2005/2006, Mr. Jackson could see that the
snow accumulations on the roof of the main house and guest cabins were
migrating downward, indicating a failure of the "cold roof'; that, as a result of
this failure, ice dams formed which damaged the metal roofs and sent ice crashing
through windows of the main house and damaged lower roofs on the cabins. 24
Only through destructive testing in 2007 was it possible to confirm that the cold

23

R, Vol. 2, p. 361, L. 26-p. 362, L 13.
R, Vo1. 2, p. 362, L 14 - p. 363, L. 5. Contrary to Storey's assertion (Storey Br. at 21), Mr. Jackson's affidavit
described defective cold roofs causing ice dams not only on the main house, but also on the cabins. Id. p. 362, L. 27
- p. 363, L. 6.
24

10

roofs had been constructed improperly and not in accordance with the
architectural plans. 25
•

At the time of those heavy snow loads, Jackson observed that in the roof structure
of the cabins, two of the 4x4 sleepers broke, the cantilevered 2x6 purlins broke,
and the metal roofing bent and had to be replaced. 26

•

In the winter of 2004 (under the previous caretaker) and the spring of 2005
(during Mr. Jackson's tenure), water intrusion first became evident. By 2008,
water was consistently invading the house around window casings and between
the ceiling and chimney masonry, and was pooling on the floors. 27

•

In September 2005, the front entry stairs collapsed into the soil, revealing that the
soil surrounding the house had not been properly compacted. That led to the
discovery that other structures had also settled excessively, and had to be
replaced. 28

•

Mr. Jackson described how, in July 2005, water flooded into the house when
painters attempted to power-wash the exterior of the house next to large timber
beams which extended from the exterior into the interior of the house. That led to
the discovery of a lack of flashing or exterior sealing of the beams. 29

•

The Trust's ensuing intrusive investigation also revealed that Storey had left large
rough cut holes in the sub roofs of all three cabins, allowing a direct path for

75 Id., p. 364, L. 25 - p. 365, L. 11. The contract contained a five-year warranty on the roof, in addition to the
f;,eneral 18-month warranty to which Storey refers (Storey Br. at 16). See Trust Br. at 2 n.5, 34.
Id., p. 363, LL. 6-9.
27 Id., p. 363, LL. 10-19.
28 ld., p. 363, LL. 22-26.
29
ld., p. 364, LL. 3-15.

11

water intrusion, and had improperly finished the roof so that water was directed
behind or in front of the shear wall and/or siding. 30
The trial court took no interest in this evidence. At the June 19, 2008 oral argument on
the ruling below, the trial court agreed with the statement by John Hanover, counsel for the
Trust, that it was not a summary judgment hearing, and that the key stipulated fact underlying the
issue before the comt was that the two arbitrations involved the same contract. 31 When Mr.
Hanover offered to provide illustrative evidence of the actual latent defects, the court said: "I
can't consider it. . . . Whatever they may or may not show won't be of any value on the legal
questions I have to resolve."32
The Trust's repair work and investigation continued for over four months after the
hearing. 33 Three months after the trial court's ruling that even latent defect claims would be
barred by res judicata, the Trust attempted to submit additional evidence of defects being
uncovered in the investigation as part of a motion for reconsideration34 in the hope that the
clearly undiscoverable-and serious-nature of the defects might induce the trial court to
reevaluate the wisdom of barring all latent defect claims as a matter of law. That evidence
included the Affidavit of Richard Stark, an employee of the contractor retained by the Trust to
investigate and design repairs for the structural deficiencies. 35 Mr. Stark stated that during the
investigation in July 2008, he discovered:

30

Id., p. 365, LL. 14-22.
Tr, Vol. l, p. 173, LL. 20-25.
32
Tr, Vol. 1, p. 174, LL. 1-21 (emphasis added).
33
R, Vol. 3, p. 533, L. 23-p. 534, L. 8; R, Vol. 3, p. 590, 'fij[ 1-4.
34
R, Vol. 3, pp. 448-49 (Motion for Reconsideration and Notice of Hearing); id., pp. 567-68 (Amended Notice of
Hearing).
35
R, Vol. 3, p. 590, 'fij[ 1-4.
31
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•

In the three cabins, out of a total of 28 "hold down bolts" embedded in the
concrete foundation, 13 were not connected to the wood framing. These bolts are
designed to attach the framing to the foundation to transfer forces from the shear
panels of a structure to the foundation to provide stability. 36 To examine the
bolts, it had been necessary to dig through the blown insulation. To repair the
defective connections, it had been necessary to remove part of the exterior siding
and structural plywood. 37

•

When siding was removed to install the missing hold-down bolt connections,
Stark discovered that the specified nailing for the structural panels had been
omitted by Storey. Like the hold-down bolts, the nailing pattern of the shear
panel wall is an integral part of the structural system. The defective nailing
became visible only through removal of the siding-and the siding would not
have been remov¢d but for the fact that removal was necessary to instaH the
missing hold-down bolt connections. 38

If the issue before the trial court had been as Storey now claims, the Trust's evidence would have
created a question of fact regarding whether and to what extent latent defects existed. Further,
during the period prior to the trial court's ruling on the motion for reconsideration, Storey itself
had advised the trial court:

36

Id., p. 590, Tl[ 5-9.
Id., p. 591, <Jffi 10-12.
38 Id., p. 591, <J[ 13-14. Contrary to Storey's assertion (Storey Br. at 22), the Trust did move to supplement the
Clerk's Record with this evidence. R, Vol. 3, pp. 608-609 (Request for Supplementation of Clerk's Record); id., p.
606 (Request for Supplementation of Reporter's Transcript with transcript of September 22, 2008 hearing on motion
for reconsideration).
37
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Storey needs to inspect the plaster, wall joints, and floor joints to see if there are
signs of cracking or distress caused by inadequate shear wall construction.
Defendants complain about surface drainage. Storey needs to inspect walls
39
throughout to see if there are signs of leakage or moisture intrusion.
and:
[D]efendants [sic - Storey] seek access to property to see if the alleged defects
were latent. 40
Between the Trust's affidavits and Storey's own protestations of its need to monitor
closely the months-long investigation and repair work, the court had before it very substantial
evidence that (a) latent defects had been discovered and (b) evidence bearing on the issue of
latent defects was being revealed as the Trust's repair work proceeded-even as late as
September 22, 2008. The months-long process of uncovering the evidence would have
precluded even consideration of a motion addressing the fact question of which of the Trust's
alleged defects were latent before November, 2008, when the Trust would have the facts in hand.
The Trust would probably have needed-and been entitled to-a further delay in any such
hearing to conduct discovery in light of the evidence it had uncovered regarding Storey's work.
lfthe Trust had a burden on this appeal to support reversal of a ruling that there were no
latent defects, the record would support remand for a hearing to consider all the evidence the
Trust has now uncovered while Storey extensively monitored that work. But the trial court made
no such ruling. Instead, the court denied the Trust's motion for reconsideration, and reconfirmed
the limited scope of the issue it had previously decided:

39

R, Vol. 3, p. 464, LL. 3-6. See also R, Vol. 3, p. 553, L. 19 - p. 554, L. 2 (Storey stated in an affidavit:
"Defendants' structures have metal roofs. Underneath those roofs there is substantial construction work that can be
observed only after the roof is removed. . .. Defendants plan to remove roof purlins, blocking, sleepers, and
sheeting. In order to demonstrate Storey's workmanship and conformity of Storey's work to the plans and
specifications, ... having regular access to Defendants' property for Storey and Storey's experts is critical.").
40
R, Vol. 3, p. 565.
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I'm not changing or modifying my firior ruling. . . . [W]hether they are, in fact,
latent defects I think is immaterial. 1

C.

The Record Contains Admissible Evidence of Latent Defects and of the Need for
Extensive Further Investigation.
Storey's argument that Mr. Jackson's testimony is inadmissible (Storey Br. at 28-30) is

no basis for affirmance for several reasons.

42

First, as Storey said, the trial court never ruled on

Storey's motion to strike Mr. Jackson's affidavit
... because the trial court decided as a matter of law that there was no latent
defect exception to res judicata. (Storey Br. at 5.)

I.e., the trial court's erroneous ruling on res judicata made the Jackson affidavit irrelevant along
with all the other evidence the Trust offered in order to show actual latent defects.
Second, Storey concedes that it will be Storey's burden at trial-not the Trust's-to
establish that one or more defects the Trust now alleges could have been discovered with "due
diligence" in 2003. 43 If Storey's current version of the issue before the trial court were correct,
then it was Storey, not the Trust, that failed to sustain its burden. Storey made no effort to do so
because it had successfully contended that the court need not and should not decide the issue of
latency.
Third, the trial court had made a procedural ruling that would have made a 56(f) motion
by the Ttust improper and futile. Storey now contends the Trust should have made such a

41

Supp Tr, Vol. I (Supplemental Reporter's Transcript on Appeal), p. 16, LL.3-25 (italics added).
In the trial court, Storey moved to strike Mr. Jackson's affidavit "on the ground the affidavit is based on hearsay,
does not fix blame for any defects on Storey, is not based on 2003 knowledge or information, and/or is irrelevant
because it does not attempt to demonstrate that the defects about which complaint is now made could [sic - could
not] have been discovered with due diligence prior to the 2003 arbitration." R, Vol. 3, p. 414, L. 21 - p. 415, L. 2.
Storey now adds that Mr. Jackson is not an expert, and cannot testify to "due diligence" efforts prior to 2003. Storey
Br. at 28-29.
43
R, Vol. 2, p. 291, L. 14.
42
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motion (Storey Br. at 49-50) but Storey must live with its own procedural success below. Storey
persuaded the trial court to sequence the hearings in order to avoid considering the issue of latent
defects if it agreed with Storey's legal contention. The court did, and it consistently declined to
listen to evidence of actual latent defects.

In view of the trial court's chosen procedure, the Trust simply made an effort to provide
examples of the latent defects that its own caretaker, Mr. Jackson, and (later) its repair
contractor, Mr. Stark, had discovered so far. This evidence was admissible on the issue of the
existence of latent defects. Mr. Jackson is qualified as a percipient witness to describe what he
saw and to relate it to a business record created by the previous caretaker. 44 Mr. Stark's
description of the missing hold-down connections and the missing shear wall nailing is obviously
admissible, as is his testimony that these conditions were hidden. 45 Storey's own contentions in
seeking inspection rights during the removal and reinstallation of the roofs and walls eloquently
attest that the conditions being uncovered were not readily apparent-i.e., Storey insisted on
constant monitoring because Storey recognized that the only moment in time when evidence of
the nature and extent of the defects would be revealed was as the individual sections of the roofs
and walls were removed and in the short period before the deficiencies then revealed were
repaired and the roof or siding section was replaced. These events were occurring constantly in
the period June-October 2008. 46

44

R, Vol. 2, p. 361, L. 20-p. 362, L. 13.
R, Vol. 3, p. 590, '![ 5 -p. 591, '![ 14.
46
See R, Vol. 3, p. 471, LL. 10-22 (Storey's motion for inspection, filed July 9, 2008, seeking preservation of
evidence); id., p. 465, LL. 16-20 (seeking access for Storey's retained expert); id., p. 544, LL. 1-4 (Storey's reply
brief on motion for inspection, filed July 21, 2008, stating Storey's need for immediate access while demolition and
45

repairs are done).
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D.

Storey Concealed Its Own Defective Work.
Storey argues that it did not actively conceal defective work, but even on the limited facts

available to the Trust at the time of the rulings below it is clear that Storey' s actions prevented
the Trust from discovering important defects until they manifested themselves in perceptible
damage. Mr. Jackson and Mr. Stark's affidavits disprove Storey's assertion that "[tJhere is no
affidavit that says any defect was concealed or was caused by construction and not by design."
Storey Br. at 20. Storey had an obligation to perform the work to specifications and according to
industry standards. Storey cannot credibly deny-much less disprove as a matter of law-that it
knew that the specified shear wall nailing and hold-down connections were missing. Storey was
responsible for installing both, and Storey failed to do it. Storey also knew the flashing was
installed improperly, and that the subroofs had holes in them. Storey did or failed to do these
things, and then covered up the defects by installing siding, insulation and the outer roof surface.
Storey had the primary obligation to detect and repair its own deficiencies, not to bury them
uncoITected beneath the siding and roof and hope for the best. Storey also repeatedly misled the
Trust by assuring it that it had properly performed its work when it submitted progress billings
and accepted payment. 47
The Trust was not obligated to, and did not, have a team of inspectors following Storey
and its subcontractors around watching every worker every hour of the day to make sure they did
the work properly before it was buried behind finished surfaces. That was Storey' s obligation.

47

See Trust Br. at 6-8.
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E.

Whether the Trust Actually Litigated Any Defect Claims in the Payment
Arbitration Was Not Decided Below, Is Not Before this Court, and Is Irrelevant to
the Trial Court's Ruling.
The second new version of Storey' s affirmative defense of res judicata is its claim on this

appeal that some defects must have been actually litigated and decided in the Payment
Arbitration and are therefore barred by issue preclusion, although Storey is unable to identify any
specific defects, any evidence offered to prove those defects, or any reference to any defects in
the award. See Storey Brief at 2, 8, 11-14, 23. Storey never asked the trial court to consider this
issue, but instead asked it to decide the question of claim preclusion on the assumption that
defects existed that were not discoverable at the time of, much less litigated in, the first
arbitration. Having accepted this invitation, the trial court did not decide the issue whether latent
defects existed or the issue whether actual defect claims had been litigated in the first
arbitration-issues that would have been considered in the mini trial.

If this Court reverses the trial court's ruling, and a trial is held on the Trust's defect
claims, Storey-not the Trust-will bear the burden of proving that the Trust actually previously
litigated some or all of the specific defects the Trust identifies now that its investigation is
complete. However, all the evidence in the current record contradicts any such assertion. Trust
Br. at 3-4; cf Storey Br. at 18. For example, as the Trust explained in its opening brief, the Trust
sought a monetary award in connection with its other counterclaims against Storey but none for
its general counterclaim for construction defects. 48 See Storey Br. at 12; Trust Br. at 3-4.
Storey argues that the arbitration award was a determination that Storey's work was in
conformity with the contract (Storey Br. at 23). But that is an issue preclusion argument that
48

Storey suggests the filing of the amended counterclaim indicates the Trust must have litigated defect claims in the
first arbitration. Storey Br. at 17, 19, 25, 43-44. This inference is not merited, but is irrelevant to the Trust's right to
bring claims that it could not have discovered-and thus could not have litigated or alleged-in the first arbitration.
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depends on whether any defect issue was actually litigated. None was, and certainly the Trust
did not and could not have litigated any latent defects-defects that by definition were
undiscoverable until after the Payment Arbitration. The arbitrators' award is a basis for claim
preclusion only as to claims that were reasonably discoverable at the time. The order barring the
Trust from arbitrating its claim for latent defects is the ruling that is the subject of this appeal.

F.

The Trial Court's Ruling Was Error Because Under Idaho Law, Res Judicata
Cannot Bar Claims Based on Facts that Were Unknown and Undiscoverable at the
Time of the Judgment in the Prior Action.
Storey contends that there was only one "transaction"-"the construction of Hanks'

home"-so that any claims based on defects in that work had to be brought in the 2003 Payment
Arbitration or be forever barred by res judicata. Storey Br. at 31. Under Storey' s theory, even
defects that Storey had actively covered up, and that the Trust could not possibly have
discovered by 2003, are claims that "might and should have been litigated in the [2003 Payment
Arbitration]" and are now barred. Storey Br. at 32. Storey has not supported this argument with
an Idaho-or any--case so holding. Even Storey appears to contradict its own assertions when it
contends that the Trust's claims for latent defects should be barred because of "Hanks' utter
failure to demonstrate that Hanks performed any due diligence before the 2003 arbitration,"
implicitly conceding that inability to discover the defects with due diligence would require
affirmance.
Under Idaho cases, Storey' s burden on remand will be to establish that the defects alleged
by the Trust were discoverable with reasonable diligence in 2003. Under the patties' contract,
Storey' s burden will be to establish that the Trust actually knew of the defects in 2003.
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I.

Two Claims Involve the "Same Transaction" Only If Both Claims Depend on
the Same Material Facts.

This Court's pragmatic analysis of a "transaction" for res judicata purposes turns on the
specific material facts necessary to establish each claim.
In Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 157 P.3d 613 (2007), this Court found that
Ticor's overpayment to Stanion in the bankruptcy proceeding, and Ticor's later unjust
enrichment claim against Stanion based on that overpayment, arose out of the "same
transaction." 144 Idaho at 126; see Trust Br. at 21. Storey selectively quotes language from the
opinion out of context while ignoring the Court's analysis, its controlling statements and the
material facts. The Court did not simplistically rule that, because there was only one agreement
between Ticor and Stanion, all claims relating to that contract were the "same transaction" as
Storey argues. Storey Br. at 33. Instead, the Court based its decision on a narrower version of
"transaction," holding that Ticor knew that it had mistakenly overpaid Stanion. 49 The payment,
not the overall contract, was the "transaction":
Ticor's present claim [for unjust enrichment] arises out of the same transaction
addressed by the bankruptcy court in the prior adjudication: Ticor's disbursement
of sale proceeds. 50
The concept of "transaction" and the concept of due diligence are intertwined-the issue
is whether the claimant in the exercise of due diligence should have known of the material facts
on which the claim depended-the "transaction." In Ticor, the material facts were not the
contract but the payment. Because Ticor knew of that material fact, it "could and should" have

sought relief for the overpayment in the bankruptcy proceeding. 51

49

144 Idaho at 122-23.

50

Id., 144 Idaho at 126 (italics added).
ld., 144 Idaho at 125.

51
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Although Storey cites Diamond52 four times (Storey Br. at 7, 32, 35, 36), it never
addresses the Court's analysis of the controlling "transaction" in that case because it simply
cannot be squared with Storey's version of the rule: the Court clearly did not hold that the
contract between Farmers and Diamond was the "transaction." Had it done so, the Court could
have disposed of the res judicata issue in a few sentences. Instead, the Court carefully analyzed
the material elements of the two claims, holding that the "alleged slanderous statements made by
Raney ... [were] the subject of the Idaho action" and were also the basis for the claim that had
been reduced to judgment in Oregon-i.e., "Diamond himself relied on the statements made by
Raney in the Oregon case as a basis for his fraud claim .... " Diamond, ll9 Idaho at 151; see
Trust Br. at 19-21. The Diamond Court supported its approach to the "transaction" issue by
quoting the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Sec. 24:
What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction" ... [is] to be detennined
pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are
related in time, space, origin or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial
unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or
business understanding or usage. 53
The Restatement approach approved by this Court is a far cry from the simplistic rule that Storey
persuaded the lower court to apply. For this reason, Storey never addresses this Restatement
formulation in its brief.
Even more tellingly, Storey never mentions the portion of the arbitration provision of the
contract providing that, in any single arbitration under the contract,

52
53

Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146,804 P.2d 319 (1990).
Diamond, 119 Idaho at 150 (italics added).
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[t]he party filing a notice of demand for arbitration must assert in the demand all
Claims then known to that party on which arbitration is permitted to be
demanded. 54
That provision-in the very contract Storey claims to be the ''transaction"-unmistakably
establishes the "parties' expectations or business understanding." Storey never addresses the fact
that the contract's definition of the paities' duties to bring claims in a single arbitration is
obviously controlling here since the proceedings at issue are not judicial proceedings but are
creations of the parties' agreement. The contract does not even require "due diligence," but
requires only that the party bring all claims actually "then known."
Under Idaho law, the parties' expectations are material to the definition of "transaction"
in a given case even where the two proceedings are court actions rather than arbitrations. When
a contract provides for arbitration of disputes relating to the contract, the contract that creates the
proceeding defines the claims that must be brought in an arbitration or be forever lost. This
contract allows the Trust to bring a second arbitration asserting any claim not actually "known"
at the time of the first. Idaho law would in any event allow a second arbitration to bring a claim
based on material facts-i.e., specific defects-not previously discoverable by reasonable
diligence since such material facts are the relevant "transaction."
Just as Storey cited Diamond without addressing the Court's actual analysis of the
"transaction" issue, Storey ignores the analyses in Aldape55 and Magic Valley. 56 As in Diamond,
the Comt in Magic Valley did not simply rule that, because both claims grew out of a single
contract, res judicata applied. The Court focused on the material facts creating the two claims:
the first claim asserted personal liability of the two individuals; the second claim sought to pierce
54

Ap, No. 3, p. 21, Par4.6.5 (italics added).
Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 668 P.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1983).
56
Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434,849 P.2d 107 (1993).
55
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the corporate veil to create the same personal liability; both depended on the same material
facts. 57 Magic Valley reiterated the approval of the Restatement formulation in Diamond that
Storey ignores. 58 Magic Valley unmistakably used a "pragmatic" definition of "transaction" that
emphasized the specific material facts underlying the two claims:
This claim [veil-piercing] arose out of the same transaction that was the basis for
Magic Valley's action in Magic Valley I and II-the liability of Helen and
Margaret personally for the breach of the contractual arrangement .... 59
The Court did not hold that the "transaction" was the underlying contract; it held the
transaction was the material facts that would support, or defeat, personal liability.
Instead of confronting the analysis in Diamond, Magic Valley and Aldape that shows how
the Idaho court defines "transaction," Storey simply quotes the oft-repeated general statements
that if the transaction is the same, then the second claim is barred. 60
Storey' s approach of ignoring this Court's analysis while quoting general statements
extends to its discussion of Shirey, 61 Andrus,62 C Systems63 and Hindmarsh64 (Storey Br. at 3738), all of which actually apply the "operative" or "material fact" definition of "transaction."
These cases are not particularly illuminating on this appeal because in none of them was there
any serious question of an unknown claim. But all four cases use the "operative fact" approach
to what constitutes a "transaction."

57

Magic Valley, 123 Idaho at 438; see Trust Br. at 16.
Id. at 437.
59
Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
60
Storey Br. at 35-36.
61
Farmers Nat'/ Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 878 P.2d 762 (1994)
62
Andrus v. Niclwlson, 145 Idaho 774, 186 P.3d 630 (2008).
63
C Systems, Inc. v. McGee, 145 Idaho 559, 181 P.3d 485 (2008)
64
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 57 P.3d 803 (2002).
58
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In Shirey, this Court found that the "underlying operative facts are the same for both
cases" because the issue that arose in a bankruptcy proceeding (the bank's petition for relief from
the automatic stay) involved the "very issue at the heart of the Shireys' counterclaim" in the
second action-the Shireys' rights in the collateral. 65 The Court held that the counterclaim issue
"should have been raised in the bankruptcy court."66 Obviously, the Shireys' "knew or should
have known" of the operative facts-their rights under the agreement-at the time of the
bankruptcy case. 67
In Andrus, the Court distinguished the theory of recovery from the operative facts giving
rise to the claim, holding that "claim preclusion ... is not limited to theories that were actually
litigated in the prior lawsuit."68 Both actions-the first, a claim to a statutory right of way, the
second, an effort to condemn a right of way--entailed the right to use a road over others'
prope1ty to access mining claims. The operative facts were the same, so the "condemnation
proceedings could have been, and should have been, brought in the first lawsuit. " 69 As in Shirey,
the case involved no contention that the plaintiff was unaware of the operative facts at the time
of the first action.
In C Systems the issue in both cases was whether a transfer of assets was effected by
McGee without authmity. The operative facts were the same. The main argument advanced
against applying res judicata was apparently that the facts were not known when the first action

65

Shirey, 126 Idaho at 69.
ld.
67
ld.
68
Andrus, 145 Idaho at 777.
69
ld. at 778.
66
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was filed, but it was conceded that they were known when it was tried, so the issues "not only
should have been litigated in the first suit, but actually were litigated and decided .... "

70

Hindmarsh was a classic case of two actions proceeding on identical operative facts
relating to liability that were obviously known to the plaintiff at the time of the first action. The
initial property damage action barred the second personal injury action because the same
operative facts would determine liability. The only serious issue in the case was whether res
judicata arises where the first action was in small claims court.

71

Storey does not explain how any of these four cases supports its argument that the
parties' overall contractual relationship is the "transaction" without regard to whether the claims
depend on the same operative facts. Instead, Storey ignores the factual and analytical context of
these cases, just as it ignores the Court's analysis in other, more germane cases that demonstrate
that a "transaction" under Idaho law is a set of material facts on which a claim depends. Res
judicata does not apply where those facts were not reasonably discoverable at the time of the first
action.
Nor is there any authority for Storey's argument that when the court confirmed the
arbitration award, the Trust could or should have moved to exclude latent defects "from the
preclusive effect" of that judgment (Storey Br. at 45). The sole issue is whether the Trust may
pursue claims for defects that were not discoverable at the time of the first arbitration hearing
and entry of the award.

°C Systems, 145 Idaho at 562.

7

71

Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94.
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2.

The Trust's Claims for Latent Defects Are Not Merely "New Evidence" of the
Trust's Prior Counterclaim.

Storey confuses the issue of undiscoverable facts without which there is no claim with (a)
mere additional evidence that bears on a previously known claim and (b) a mere change in legal
theory where the underlying material facts are the same. 72 See Andrus, supra, Aldape, 105 Idaho
at 260-61 (operative fact was change in the river's course, second action merely changed theory
of recovery from adverse possession to accretion), and Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121
Idaho 610, 613, 615, 826 P.2d 1322 (1992) (trial court confused material facts on which a claim
depended with mere "new evidence" of the same claim; a claim for failure to disclose inadequate
water was based on different material facts from the claims in the first action, requiring a trial of
whether the facts about the water had been reasonably discoverable at the time of the first
action).
The question is whether at the time of the first action the plaintiff knew the material facts
on which the claim depends. In Durrant73 the Comt rejected a res judicata defense because,
although in the first action Durrant had some information suggesting that Ugenti "might be the
alter ego" of QFM, Durrant lacked knowledge of the material facts necessary to make the claim
without potentially violating I.R.C.P. 11.74 The question was whether the material facts on
which the claim depended were known.

Kawai Farms applies the same basic principle. Storey tries to transform Kawai Farms
into a test of whether the Trust has demonstrated its due diligence in discovering defects (Storey
Br. at 54), diverting attention from the analytical significance of the decision. The Trust has no

72

Storey Br. at 36-38.
Durrant v. Quality First Marketing, Inc., 127 Idaho 558, 903 P.2d 147 (Ct. App. 1995).
74
Durrant, 121 Idaho at 561.
73
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obligation on this appeal to demonstrate that it actually exercised due diligence in 2003 because
the trial court ruled such evidence to be irrelevant and assumed that undiscoverable, latent
defects existed. Rather, Kawai Farms is significant here because (a) the plaintiff made a general
claim of misrepresentation of the quality of the real property in the first action; (b) this Court
held that a misrepresentation (or non-disclosure) regarding the adequacy of water was not the
same claim because it depended on different material facts; (c) therefore, even though a general

allegation of misrepresentations had been made, res judicata did not apply if the facts material to
the specific misrepresentation could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence, a
question of fact.
The key principle of Kawai Farms is not properly confined to cases of misrepresentation
(Storey Br. at 54). Just as a specific misrepresentation is a separate claim if it involves distinct
material facts, a claim of specific latent defects entails distinct material facts from a claim of
different, known defects. This is inherent in the latency: obviously, if the defects were
undetectable at the time of the first action, they formed no part of any "defect" claim then being
asserted, or of any that could have been asserted. In "transaction" terms, the Court's reasoning
in Kawai Farms demonstrates that a latent defect, not known or discoverable at the time of the
first action, is necessarily based on different "material facts" from the first claim, and is not
barred by res judicata.
However, even if misrepresentation or non-disclosure claims were a special case under
res judicata, this Court's statement that
Kawai, as with any reasonable person, might very well have believed himself to
be transacting business with a gentleman of honor75
75

Kawai Farms, 121 Idaho at 615.
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could be made about the Trust, which relied on Storey' s repeated representations that it had
performed its work in accordance with contract requirements, as opposed to failing to correct
defects that it then buried behind siding and roofing. The trial court deemed this and all other
issues relating to the Trust's due diligence to be irrelevant in holding that no defect, no matter
how latent and undiscoverable, could be the subject of a second arbitration. Storey' s knowledge
of, failure to disclose and concealment of defects that would not be discoverable on reasonable
inspection after construction support a constructive fraud claim. 76 Where defects are buried in
the completed construction, without notice to the owner, the owner has_no.duty to dig them up or
lose any right to sue once they manifest themselves. See Bethlahmy, supra.
The Trust obviously had no burden below to prove such a claim, but its Defect
Arbitration Demand encompasses such claims and cannot be barred until the Trust has the
opportunity to establish them. The Arbitration Demand is general and encompasses tort
claims. 77 The Trust had no duty to specify legal theories in the Demand, only the nature of the
dispute. 78 The Trust gave notice in its trial court pleadings that its claims would encompass tort
and contract theories. 79

3.

The Virginia Courl's Decision in Waterfront Marine Does Not Supporl Res
Judicata Here.

Storey suggests that the Waterfront Marine8° case ("WMC'') held res judicata barred the
homeowners' ("49ers") second claim for defects in their bulkhead even though those defects,

76

Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 59, 61-62, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Trust Br. at 39.
Trust Br. at 38.
78
See Storey Br. at 54; Trust Br. at 38 n.71; Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, Rule R-4.
79
R, Vol. IT, p. 380, L. 19 - p. 382, L. 25; Trust Br. at 38.
80
Wate,front Marine Constr., Inc. v. North End 49ers Sandbridge Bulkhead Groups A, Band C, 468 S.E.2d 894
(Va. 1996).
77
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which had existed at the time of their earlier claim, had been "subsequently discovered." Storey
Br. at 39. In fact, WMC is directly parallel to Andrus and Aldape. The 49ers discovered all of
the design defects through the report of their expert before alleging breach of contract in the first
arbitration. Based on the same facts, they changed their theory to breach of warranty in the
second arbitration. 81 That a storm and actual damage had intervened was beside the point-the
storm did not reveal defective design. The 49ers had already identified those defects. The storm
merely confirmed the weaknesses the 49ers had previously discovered. The 49ers made no
latent defect claim.

4.

Storey's Citations to Personal Injury Cases Do Not Support the Trial Court's
Ruling.

None of the personal injury cases that Storey cites (Storey Br. at 56-59) provides any
support for Storey's position. Each stands only for the recognized rule that governed in WMC:
when a plaintiff litigates a claim for a wrongful act-for example, negligence causing an auto
accident, a factual misrepresentation inducing a contract, or a construction defect in bulkheadand obtains a judgment, that plaintiff cannot later assert claims for additional damage caused by
that same, previously-discovered wrongful act. There is no difference between personal injury
cases and construction defect cases on this point (cf Storey Br. at 58). See, e.g., Houser v.
Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel, Inc., 103 Idaho 441,446,649 P.2d 1197 (1982) (Storey Br. at 57)
(personal injury); WMC, 468 S.E.2d at 434 (construction defects).
Storey turns the rule on its head, arguing (contrary to Kawai Farms) that if the legal label
·for a claim (misrepresentation in Kawai Farms) is used again in pursuing a different claim based
on newly-discovered material facts, the label is a basis for invoking res judicata (here, "defective
81

WMC, 468 S.E.2d at434-35; see Trust Br. at 27-30.
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constrnction"; see Storey Br. at 58). This is precisely the non-pragmatic, formulaic approach the
Restatement and Idaho jurisprndence reject. The controlling question is whether the operative
facts underlying the claim are the same, or were reasonably discoverable, and should have been
litigated in the first action regardless of whether the second, newly-discovered claim can be
alleged under the same legal theory, or label, as a different claim in the prior action.
Houser is a straightforward application of the rnle that a plaintiff cannot pursue a second
action for additional damage arising from the same operative facts on liability-parallel to lVMC
and to C Systems (suit for personal injury barred by prior action for property damage based on
same material facts re liability). Houser is an even more compelling case than C Systems
because Houser (a) had sued based on the same underlying liability facts and (b) had actually
litigated both his knee and back injuries in his first claim. Unlike C Systems where the issue was
whether the personal injury claim should have been litigated in the first action, in Houser a back
claim was litigated. The second action simply sought additional damages for the same injury
predicated on the same operative liability facts. Houser, 103 Idaho at 446. The court stated:
In the prior proceeding, the claimant sought ... benefits for total and permanent
disability on the basis of the knee injury sustained in the industrial accident on
January 9, 1978 and back injuries allegedly sustained in falls in June and August,
1978, which were said to have been occasioned by the instability of his injured
knee. Claimant testified at length about these alleged back injuries and their
effects on his physical condition and his ability to be employed. In claimant's
subsequent application for hearing in the instant case, he sought additional
compensation for back injuries allegedly sustained in a fall in August 1978, which
was allegedly occasioned by the instability of claimant's previously injured knee.
That is the same incident which formed the basis for claimant's claim ... in the
prior proceeding. In sum, the proceeding in the instant case and in the prior
proceeding arose out of the same operative facts between the same parties. The
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Commission properly dismissed the application for hearing on the basis of the
doctrine of res judicata. 82
The Trust neither alleged, nor could have known of, the operative facts giving rise to
Storey' s liability for latent defects at the time of the first arbitration. Unlike the claimant in

Houser, the Trust is not seeking "additional damages" for claims previously alleged or tried; it is
seeking for the first time to recover for defects (not merely damages) that did not manifest
themselves until after the first arbitration. The facts the Trust did not have in the prior arbitration
were those creating liability-the hidden defective work. Unlike the 49ers in WMC, the Trust did
not identify Storey' s failures in the first action and then suffer later damage from those very
failures. Rather, the damage that began to appear triggered the investigation that revealed the
predicate for liability: the defects.
Faulkner. Storey also cites Faulkner v. Caledonia County Fair Ass'n, 869 A.2d 103 (Vt.
2004) (Storey Br. at 59), which simply holds that a plaintiff that has recovered for head injuries
cannot bring a second suit for epilepsy arising from the same injury even though these damages
are unexpectedly larger than at the time of the first action. 869 A.2d at 109. But the Trust
neither tried, knew of nor recovered for the claims it now seeks to make: latent defects of which
it was unaware. The point here is not the Trust's knowledge of damages, it is knowledge of the
underlying facts-the specific defects--creating the cause of action.
LeBeau. In LeBeau v. Dimig, 446 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 1989) (Storey Br. at 58-59), the
court applied a similar analytical approach in the statute of limitations context-that if a plaintiff
had sufficient knowledge of the facts to be able to timely bring a suit for damages for a wrongful
act (minor head injuries from an auto accident), she should not be allowed to bring a later second
82

Id. (italics added).

31

suit, beyond the statute of limitations, when she discovers increased damages from the same
wrongful act (epilepsy caused by the head injuries). The operative facts giving rise to liability
are the same in both cases, and some damage had occurred, completing the elements of the cause
of action. The running of the statute was triggered, the court reasoned,

[b]ecause there appear to be no disputed fact issues as to the knowledge of the
plaintiff of the necessary elements for bringing her cause of action within the two. • · [.]83
year statute o,fl1m1tatlons
The "knowledge of the plaintiff' here, under the assumption the trial court made in
barring the arbitration, was zero:

... What Mr. flanks knew then or the owners of the house actually knew then
or know now about these . .. [alleged] defects in construction or whether they
are, in fact, latent defects I think is immaterial. 84
The LeBeau court also reasoned that statutes of limitations should be applied consistently with
their purpose to provide protection against the assertion of stale claims. LeBeau, 446 N.W.2d at
802. By contrast, res judicata applies only to protect courts and litigants from having to litigate

repetitious or duplicative claims based on the same wrongful act. Ticor, 144 Idaho at 123. To
date, Storey has not had to spend any time or expense litigating any defect in the Trust's
property. Storey certainly has not had to litigate any defect that is ultimately determined was

83

LeBeau, 446 N.W.2d at 803. The same court later further limited its holding in LeBeau, and held that a plaintiff's
"manifestation of asbestosis does not trigger the running of the statute of limitations on all separate, distinct, and
later-manifested diseases which may have stemmed from the same asbestos exposure," reasoning that it served no
public interest to require that, "upon manifestation of any harm, the injured party must then, if ever, sue for all
harms the same exposure may (or may not) occasion sometime in the future." Wilber v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 476 N.W.2d 74, 78 (Iowa 1991). See also Potts v. Celotex Corp., 796 S.W.2d 678, 684-85 (Tenn. 1990)
(declining to follow LeBeau and holding the statute of limitations should not require a plaintiff to sue to vindicate a
wrong "at a time when injury is unknown and unknowable.").
84
Tr, Vol. I, Tab 5 (Supplemental Reporter's Transcript on Appeal) at p. 15, L.21 - 16, L. 25 (italics added).
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non-discoverable at the time of the first arbitration. The Defect Arbitration the Trust seeks will
be the first occasion for Storey to defend itself against latent defect claims.

G.

On Remand, Any Remaining Factual Issues Concerning the Application of Res
Judicata Are for the Arbitrators to Decide; It Is Neither Onerous Nor Unfair to
Require Storey to Sustain Its Burden of Proof on Its Affirmative Defense Against
the Trust's Latent Defect Claims.
Under Idaho law, where a contract is susceptible of an interpretation requiring arbitration

of a particular dispute, the dispute must be arbitrated. Storey wrongly contends the opposite:
that the bar of res judicata is not arbitrable absent an express provision naming "res judicata" as
an arbitrable issue. (Storey Br. at 59-63; see Trust Br. at 41-44.)
This Court has held that "arbitrability is a question oflaw for the court" (Storey Br. at
61). This means simply that this Court should decide whether the lower court or the arbitration
panel will make the factual determination whether the Trust is alleging truly latent defects-i.e.,
should interpret the contract to determine if it calls for the arbitration panel to make that
determination. Under Idaho law and this contract, the job is assigned to the arbitrators.
The cases on which Storey relies do not support any different approach to the res judicata
defense from other questions of arbitrability. In Lewis v. CEDU Educational Services, Inc., 135
Idaho 139, 15 P.3d 1147 (Idaho 2000) (Storey Br. at 61 n.176), the court held that the son of the
plaintiff was not a party to the plaintiff's contract containing the arbitration clause. In Murphy v.

Mid-West Nat'/ Life Ins. Co. of Tenn., 139 Idaho 330, 78 P.3d 766 (2003) (Storey Br. at 62
n.177), the court held the arbitration clause in an insurance policy was unconscionable and
unenforceable against the insured. These cases addressed whether there was a binding
agreement to arbitrate at all.
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Neither Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398,913 P.2d 1168 (1996) (Storey Br.
at 62 & n.178), nor Western Industrial and Environmental Svcs., Inc. v. Kaldveer Assoc., Inc.,
126 Idaho 541, 887 P.2d 1048 (1994), supports Storey's argument. Wolfe holds only that, when
the trial court has ruled on res judicata as an issue of law, the court of appeals reviews the ruling
de novo. Kaldveer holds only that res judicata applies both to court judgments and arbitration
awards. Neither case even addresses the arbitrability of the res judicata issue.
Where, as here, there is clearly a binding agreement to arbitrate disputes, and the question
is the scope of the agreement, Idaho follows the general rule that"[ d]oubts are to be resolved in
favor of arbitration" of that claim or defense. Mason v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145
Idaho 197, 177 P.3d 944, 948 (Idaho 2007); see Trust Br. at 42. An issue is within the arbitration
clause unless "it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible
of an interpretation that covers" the issue. Mason, 177 P.3d at 948. Courts dealing with
arbitration clauses similar to the one in this contract have held that the defense of res judicata is
a component of the dispute on the merits and is, therefore, a matter for the arbitrator, not the
court. Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000);
Transit-Mix Concrete Corp. v. Local Union No. 282, 809 F.2d 963, 969-70 (2d Cir. 1987); Sharp
v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 434,437 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
Storey and the Trust agreed to arbitrate "any" dispute, subject to carefully identified
exceptions, among which are no routine affirmative defenses. Further, the contract itself
addresses the very issue of which claims must be brought in any given arbitration--all "known"
· claims. It is appropriate for the arbitrators to decide how to apply this provision to the facts.
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This contract is more than simply "susceptible" of an interpretation requiring arbitration
of Storey's affirmative defense; 85 there is no sensible basis for interpreting it otherwise. Storey
ducks this issue, and instead tries unsuccessfully to create a general legal principle that stands
apart from the parties' agreement. But arbitration is a creature of contract, and Idaho law
suppo1ts interpretations that favor arbitration. It certainly cannot be said "with positive
assurance" 86 that an interpretation allowing arbitration of the res judicata issue would be
unreasonable.

In holding that the court must decide even fact questions arising from the res judicata
defense, the trial court once again erroneously relied on WMC. The WMC rationale is simply
contrary to Idaho law, and is not even supported by the cases that court cited.
The Virginia court reasoned that courts must control the outcome of any res judicata issue
because it feared that arbitrators might not strictly apply the doctrine, which could defeat the
doctrine's purpose. 87 468 S.E.2d at 903. But parties choose arbitration precisely because it is a
less formal and less expensive method of settling disputes and is controlled by the parties'
agreement. Loomis, Inc. v. Cudahy, 104 Idaho 106, 108 & n.3, 656 P.2d 1359 (1982). The
Virginia court ignored the parties' contract, and did not resolve doubts in favor of arbitration.

WMC is contrary to Idaho law in reflecting a hostility to arbitration that Idaho state law and
policy reject. 88
85

Mason v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197, 177 P.3d 944,948 (2007); Int'lAss'n of Firefighters,
Local No. 672 v. City of Boise City, 136 Idaho 162, 168, 30 P.3d 940 (2001).
86 Id.
87
The court stated that under the American Arbitration Association's Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, "an
arbitration panel is not generally bound by legal principles ... (and] are entitled to make their decision based on
what they deem to be just and equitable within the scope of the parties' agreement." Id.
88
For the same reasons, the cases Storey cites from other courts adopting the WMC reasoning are also inconsistent
with Idaho law. E.g., Deerfield Constr. Co. v. Crisman Corp., 616 N.W.2d 630,632 (Iowa 2000) (cited in Storey
Br. at 63 n.182).
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It is also wrong. The WMC court relied on cases that support the opposite result. See

WMC, 468 S.E.2d at 903. The lesson of most of these cases is simply that the trier of fact in the
second proceeding-whether it is a court or an arbitration panel-may determine whether a prior
decision has res judicata effect in that second proceeding. See Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham

Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1360 (1985) (arbitrators resolved the plaintiff's state law claims,
but the plaintiff's federal securities claims were reserved for later trial in federal court because
they were within exclusively federal jurisdiction and so not arbitrable; court held the earlier
arbitration award barred the plaintiff's federal RICO claim because it was based on the same
facts as the arbitrated state law claims); Clark v. Bear Steams & Co., Inc., 966 F.2d 1318 (9th
Cir. 1992) (same, but denying res judicata because defendants had not met their burden of
"showing with certainty and clarity what issues were determined in the arbitration."). 89 Neither
case decided whether arbitrators, in an arbitration proceeding, may determine the preclusive
effect of the parties' prior litigation. The cases demonstrate only that the trier of fact in the
second proceeding (the court, in those cases) may determine whether a prior decision has res
judicata effect in that second proceeding.

89

Similarly, in Rembrandt Industries, Inc. v. Hodges International, Inc., 344 N.E.2d 383 (N.Y. 1976) (cited in
WMC, 468 S.E.2d at 903, and Storey Br. at 63 n.181), the conrt held only that in a court suit following a prior
arbitration between the parties, the judge need not refer the res judicata issue back to the arbitrators in the initial
arbitration proceeding to determine the res judicata effect of their award. In this case, that means only that the
arbitrators in the 2007 Defect Arbitration would not be required to refer the res judicata issue back to the original
arbitration panel in the 2003 Payment Arbitration. Like the court in WMC, the courts in other cases cited by Storey
also erroneously relied on Rembrandt for their holdings. See Monmouth Pub. Schools, Dist. No. 38 v. Pullen, 489
N.E.2d 1 JOO, 1103 (Ill. App. 1986) (cited by Storey at 63 n.183); Horwitz, Schakner & Associates, Inc., 625 N.E.2d
670,673 (Ill. App. 1993) (Storey Br. at 63 n.183).
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90

Res judicata is a routine factual affirmative defense, requiring the arbitrators simply to
determine whether the Trust actually knew of the defects it now seeks to arbitrate (under the
contract term) or, at most, whether the Trust should in the exercise of due diligence have known
of one or more of such defects (under Idaho case law). Storey argues that this inquiry is
burdensome since each defect must be considered and its "latency" assessed. Storey Br. at 4142, 47-48, 56. It is true that Storey's suggestion that the court must make this factual inquiry
creates unnecessary burdens versus the arbitrators doing so, but there is nothing onerous or
unfair about requiring Storey to establish a factual basis for its affirmative defense.

If the arbitration panel does the work there is little additional effort required. The
arbitrators will unavoidably receive all the evidence bearing on the issue of latency as part of
hearing the defect case-i. e., the evidence of what was found when the house was tom apart and
reassembled, including what had to be removed to reveal the facts. Having the same tribunal
decide the res judicata issue is efficient. Having a court essentially replicate the work of the
arbitrators simply to assemble a list of the claims for the arbitrators to consider is wasteful.
There should be a strong legal compulsion before such duplicative work is ordered. Storey has
supplied none.

III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court's July 2, 2008 Order and
remand with directions to dismiss Storey's Complaint for Abuse of Process with prejudice and to
enter an order requiring arbitration of the Trust's claims, including any issue of res judicata.

90

The construction contract is governed by Idaho law. Res judicata is an affirmative defense that must be proven by
a preponderance of the evidence. Ticor, 144 Idaho at 122. Idaho's Rules of Civil Procedure specify that res judicata
is among the affirmative defenses to be pied in response to a preceding pleading. I.R.C.P. 8(c).
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